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1 Introduction
This paper builds on "pecking-order theory" (POT) and signaling theories of
capital structure. These theories directly relate to asymmetric information.
According to POT (Myers and Majluf, 1984) equity represents an inferior
security (rms prefer internal funds and debt). Empirical evidence usually
supports one of the main predictions of the POT that there is a negative share
price reaction on equity issue announcements. The evidence is mixed about
whether rms always follow a pecking order hierarchy.1
According to POT, good quality rms have to use internal funds to avoid
adverse selection problems and losing value. The signalling theory of capital
structure o¤ers models (Ross, 1977; Leland and Pyle, 1978) where good quality
rms usually increase leverage to signal quality. Although the empirical evi-
dence nds some support of negative market reaction on leverage-decreasing
transactions and a positive reaction on leverage-increasing transactions, in
general it does not support a positive market reaction to debt issues. The
negative correlation between debt and protability also contradicts signaling
theory. Third, the evidence is mixed regarding the predictions of signaling
theory regarding links between capital structure choice/change and future op-
1For a review of theoretical and empirical literature on POT and signalling theories see,
for example, Klein, OBrien and Peters (2002) and Miglo (2011). For a more recent analysis
see, for instance, Komera and Lukose (2015).
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erating performance especially with regard to short-term performance.2
The literature analyzing nancing-investment games where rm insiders
have private information usually deals with situations where rms di¤er in
their qualities or overall intrinsic values. Typically, there are two types of rms:
good (high value) and bad (low value). In the present paper, we argue that
a situation where a rm has private information about the timing of earnings
may generate predictions that are not explained by POT or singalling theory
and that also may shed new light on some puzzles including the existence
of a signalling equilibrium where rms issue equity. In particular we argue
that rms with early exepcted earnings prefer issuing equity as opposed to
rm with late earnings. We then test empirically some of our results and nd
conrmation.
A situation where rmsinsiders have private information about the timing
of earnings is quite intuitive. For example, rmsmajor contracts may be pub-
lic knowledge while their timing and details may only be known to managers.
Asymmetric information regarding the timing of earnings may take place be-
cause managers often have private information about the choice of inventory
and depreciation methods, estimation of pension liabilities, capitalization of
leases and marketing expenses, recognition of sales not yet shipped, and delay
in maintenance expenditures and delays in production (Miglo, 2007). Pereira
and Sousa (2015) noted that it is likely that equity-issuing rms are often
involved in earnings management.
Our analysis is related to the asymmetric information literature analyzing
situations where rms have equal values (qualities) and private information
concerns other parameters. Examples include Giammarino and Neave (1984),
2See, for example, Jain and Kini (1994), Loughran and Ritter (1997), Mikkelson, Partch
and Shah (1997), Pereira and Sousa (2015) and discussions in Miglo (2007, 2011, 2016).
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Daniel and Titman (1995), Brick, Frierman and Kim (1998) and Miglo and
Zenkevich (2006). Miglo and Zenkevich (2006) argue that if rms di¤er in the
timing of earnings a separating equilirum may exist where some rms issue
equity. They noted, however, that the problem of private information regard-
ing the timing of earnings can be mitigated by the up-front equity nanicng
that is not considered in their paper.3 Up-front nancing is a part of our
model.4 Up-front nanicng takes a large portion of equity from existing share-
holders magnifying potential moral hazard problems (Jensen and Meckling,
1976). Hence, we include moral hazard considerations in our model as well.
Our article is also related to the literature analyzing capital structure
choice under asymmetric information in a dynamic environment (multi-period
decision-making situation). Some examples in previous literature include Lu-
cas and McDonald (1990), Viswananth (1992) and Miglo (2007, 2012). Miglo
(2007) and Miglo (2012) are the closest models because they consider situa-
tions where rms have long-term private information and rm typesorder may
change over time. However Miglo (2007) only considers a special case where
rms with higher value also have higher growth rates and neither artcile con-
siders the case where private information exclusively concerns the timing of
earnings.
3This argument is stronger when interest rates are lower. In recent years, for example,
we observe a histroically low (sometimes even negative) interest rate environment. In this
case the di¤erence between the values of rms that have di¤erent timings of earnings (same
amounts) is negligeable and up-front nancing can completely eliminate an asymmetric
information problem about the timing of earnings.
4Exisitng literature focuses on the following di¤erences between up-front and staged -
nancing: advantages of staged nancing in mitigating moral hazard issues in venture nanc-
ing (Neher, 1999); regulation requirements (Hart, 2009); impact on taxes (Mercer-Blackman,
2008). Our paper adds an asymmetric information aspect to this list.
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The summary of our main results is as follows. First, we conrm the in-
tuition described previously that if information about the timing of earnings
is asymmetric, but no moral hazard is involved, an equilibrium is one where
all rms use up-front equity nanicng and the fractions of equity are negoti-
ated with investors initially regardless of the timing of future earnings. When
both asymmetric inofrmation and moral hazard are present, multiple equilib-
ria may exist. We nd that up-front nanicing and long-term debt are never
part of e¢ cient separating equilibria. We show that the only e¢ cient separat-
ing equilibrium is one where a rm with late earnings issues short-term debt
and a rm with early earnings issues equity. This equilibrium implies that the
debt/equity ratio is negatively correlated with rms short-term earnings and
positively correalted with long-term earnings. Similarly it predicts that rms
issuing equity have higher earnings soon after the issue and lower long-term
earnings compared to non-issuing rms. These rms also have lower operating
performance in the long run. Leverage is negatively correlated with protabil-
ity because rms with higher prots in the rst period issue equity in the rst
period. Firms with a low rate of earnings growth issue equity and rms with a
high rate of earnings growth issue debt (Mohamed and Eldomiaty, 2008; and
Chichti and Bougatef, 2010).
We also test out model using a sample of 501 rms listed on NYSE, NAS-
DAQ and TSX and their capital structure choice in 2010. We nd that the
debt/equity ratio is negatively correlated with short-term earnings and posi-
tively correlated with long term earnings, which is one of our main results.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes
the basic model and presents some preliminary theoretical results. Section 3
analyses the case with asymmetric information and moral hazard and contains
major results. It also discusses the models implications. Section 4 discusses
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model extensions and robustness. Section 5 reports the results of empirical
analysis and the conclusion is drawn in Section 6.
2 Model description and some preliminaries
Consider a rm with a two-stage investment project. The models description
follows the footsteps of Miglo and Zenkevich (2006) with a major addition of
moral hazard in consideration and some other changes such as a wider range of
possible nancing strategies for rms. The rms objective is to maximize the
wealth of initial shareholders (founders), whom we will call the entrepreneur.
In each stage t = 1; 2 an amount b has to be invested. In each stage, the
project can either be successful or unsuccessful. If the former is the case, the
cash ow, rt, equals 1 and if the latter is the case, the cash ow equals 0.
The rms initial capital structure is 100% equity, with n shares outstanding.
Let t denote the proportion of equity owned by the entrepreneur in period t
(immediately after the issue of securities in period t, if it takes place).
In each period, the rms success depends on the entrepreneurs e¤ort in
that period, and the rms intrinsic quality in that period. Regardless the
level of the entrepreneurs e¤ort, some rms have better short-term earnings
potential and some rms have better long-term earnings potential. The entre-
preneurs e¤ort is zjt. zjt 2 f0; 1g, where j denotes the rms type, j 2 fl; sg.
If zjt = 0, the probability of success for either rm in period t equals 0 and
the entrepreneur gets a private benet equal to c.5 If zjt = 1, the probabil-
ity of success in period t equals jt. Without loss of generality we assume
5This way of modelling the cost of e¤ort is chosen for simplicity. Alternatively, one can
assume that there is some cost to the entrepreneur when providing a high level of e¤ort.
Qualitatively, the results will be similar.
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j1 + j2 = 1. This implies that if the entrepreneur delivers a high level of
e¤ort in both periods, the expected total earnings over the two periods are the
same (equal to unity) for both rm types and they di¤er only in their timing
of expected performances. Further we denote j the probability of success in
period 1 for type j (the probability of success in period 2 is then 1  j). We
assume l < s. It implies that s (stands for "short-term") has better expected
performance in period 1 and l (stands for "long-term") has better expected
performance in period 2.
We assume b < 1=2 with the s restricted to the interval [b; 1 b], which im-
plies that, conditional on the entrepreneurs high level of e¤ort, the investment
has non-negative net-present value (NPV) in each period, i. e. the expected
earnings are at least equal to the amount of investment in period one (b  )
and in period two (b  1  ). Also we assume
2b > maxf; 1  g (1)
implying that the earnings from only one stage are not su¢ cient to cover the
cost of investment in both stages. If the entrepreneur fails to obtain nancing,
his payo¤ equals 0. If nancing is obtained and the entrepreneur delivers a
low level of e¤ort in period t, the NPV of all benets and costs in stage t is
c  b. If zj1 = 1, the NPV of stage 1 is j   b and if zj2 = 1, the NPV of stage
2 is 1  j   b. We thus assume
c < minf; 1  g (2)
This guaranties that a high level of e¤ort is socially optimal in both periods.
The entrepreneurs choice of e¤ort and private benets are non-observable
and non-veriable. Investors make decisions about providing nancing for
the rm taking into account their beliefs about the rms type and their ex-
pectations about the entrepreneurs level of e¤ort. The rms prot and its
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capital structure choice are observable and veriable. There exists univer-
sal risk-neutrality in this economy. In addition, the competition among the
investors is perfect. This implies zero market prot and risk-neutral valua-
tion of any security issued. Finally, note that given that the high level of
e¤ort is socially optimal, the rms rst-best value (expected earnings minus
investment cost) equals the sum of the projects NPVs in stage 1 and 2 or
j   b+ 1  j   b = 1  2b.
2.1 Financing strategies
The rm may use either stage or up-front nancing, and in both cases it can
use either equity or debt.
Equity nancing. In the case of up-front equity nancing (denote this
strategy by u), the rm issues equity in the amount of 2b in the rst period.
The rm invests b immediately and keeps b for the second period. Alterna-
tively, the rm may issue an amount of equity equal to b (denote this strategy
by e). Hence, in the second period, the rm has a choice between internal
nancing (the amount of internal nancing is denoted by f) and external -
nancing that is assumed to be debt nancing (the amount of second-period
debt equals b  f). The internal nancing in period 2 (retained earnings) will
only be available if earnings are generated in period 1 and are not distributed
as dividends.6
Short-term debt (d). In this case, the rm gets an amount b from the mar-
ket by issuing short-term debt. If d was chosen and the rms prot is not
6The introduction of the possibility of other types of external nancing in the second
period will change nothing in the models main results. It will be shown that in the case of
a signalling equilibrium the value of any security issued in the second period relies heavily on
the rms expected performance in the second period, which is the key in our main results.
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su¢ cient to repay the debt (prot equals 0) then there are two possibilities.
First, the rm may be declared bankrupt. In this case, the shareholders get
nothing and the creditors receive the liquidation value VL = (Er2  b); where
0    1. This equation shows that the liquidation value is proportional to
the expected prot from the second stage of the project. For instance, if 
is low, the cost of bankruptcy is high, and the liquidation value is low. Al-
ternatively, the rm can continue to operate. This decision (to continue or
to liquidate) is the result of a renegotiation between the entrepreneur and the
creditors (Giammarino, 1989). The renegotiation is conducted in the following
manner: the entrepreneur makes a "take-it-or-leave-it" o¤er to the creditors;
the creditors may accept or reject the o¤er; if the creditors accept the continu-
ation they get a fraction of the rms equity; if the o¤er is rejected the rm is
liquidated. Note that up-front nancing cannot be used with short-term debt:
it makes no sense for the shareholders to keep cash in the presence of senior
claims in the following period. Although there are other ways of modelling
di¤erent kinds of nancing we believe that those suggested in the paper are
very general and more importantly the results about the pricing of securities
are very intuitive. We discuss some other extensions in Section 6.
Long-term debt (k). The investment has two stages in our model so we
assume that nancing with long-term debt is up-front and the rm cannot
distribute rst-period cash to the shareholders (dividend covenants). This
allows the rm to avoid the debt overhang problem in the second period when
internal funds are not su¢ cient to cover the second-period investment and the
rm has di¢ culty raising second-period nancing in the presence of long-term
claims. Alternative methods of long-term debt nancing and their implications
in a similar environment are discussed in Miglo (2007).
The sequence of events is illustrated in gure 1. We assume that the rms
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type is revealed to the entrepreneur in period 0 while nancing, investment,
and production take place in periods 1 and 2. First-period outside shareholders
(strategies e and u) discover the rms type immediately after acquiring shares.
Since the stages are technologically dependant, if the entrepreneur is unable
to obtain rst-period nancing there is no investment in either period and the
entrepreneurs utility equals 0.7
-t = 0 t = 1 t = 2s s s
Firms type
is revealed to
the entrepreneur
Entrepreneur chooses
d; e; k or u
Entrepreneur chooses z1
Investment yields r1
If d was played and r1 = 1
the creditors are paid
Shareholders determines
rst-period dividends
If d was played and r1 = 0
the entrepreneur
determines 
If the creditors reject the
o¤er, the rm is liquidated
and the creditors get VL
If external nancing
is needed, the entrepreneur
issues second-period debt
The entrepreneur chooses z2
Investment yields r2
It is distributed
to the claimholders
Figure 1. The sequence of events.
2.2 Asymmetric information without moral hazard
Consider the situation with asymmetric information about the rms type but
without moral hazard, i.e. let us assume that the entrepreneur always delivers
7Throughout the article we use the concept of Perfect-Bayesian equilibria. In some
cases, a complete description of o¤-equilibrium investors beliefs about the rm type can be
ommitted for brevity. They are avilable upon request.
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a high level of e¤ort.
Proposition 1. If there is no moral hazard, strategy u is a rst-best pooling
equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the situation where both rm types play u, i.e. raise an
amount 2b by issuing shares in period 1, invest an amount b immediately and
keep the second half (also b) for investments in period 2. Also, if a rm deviates
from this strategy and uses external nancing for stage 2, the market believes
that the rm is s. First-period outside investors get a fraction 1   1 of the
rm shares. Their expected payo¤ is (1   1)E(r1 + r2) = 1   1 since total
expected earnings equal 1. It should be equal to the amount of their investment
2b. Hence, 1  1 = 2b and 1 = 1  2b. This means that the entrepreneurs
expected payo¤ for each rm is 1E(r1 + r2) = 1   2b. This is equal to the
rst-best rm value for the entrepreneur, as was mentioned previously. If l
deviates and borrows in the second period it su¤ers from the fact that it will
be perceived by the market as type s.8 Type s is indi¤erent between internal
nancing and borrowing in the second period because the interest rate would
correspond to type s according to the market beliefs described above. This
situation constitutes an equilibrium. End Proof.
The idea behind this proposition was discussed in the introduction. In
an environment without moral hazard, total earnings are the same for all
rm types: this completely eliminates the problem of asymmetric information
under up-front nancing. l has high expected earnings in period 2 but it can
nance the second stage of the project internally using the remains of initial
8s has lower expected earnings in period 2 than l. Therefore, the value of securities is
lower in period 2 if the rm is perceived as type s comparing to the case when the rm is
perceived as type l. For price calculations, see Appendix 4.
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nancing, thereby avoiding the lemon problem.9 If s attempts to borrow in
the second period the market will correctly realize the rms type, e¤ectively
eliminating its ability to earn informational rents in this period.
3 Asymmetric information with moral hazard
In this case, the valuation of securities issued by the rm is based on the
markets belief about the entrepreneurs e¤ort. If investors believe the entre-
preneurs level of e¤ort will be low, they will either reduce the share price,
increase the interest rate charged, or refuse to nance the project. The in-
vestorsbeliefs are based on their calculation of the entrepreneurs incentives.
Therefore, the choice of nancing should send a credible signal to the market.
However, agency costs will arise under any type of nancing. Under equity
nancing, agency costs arise because the entrepreneurs fraction of equity is
reduced, decreasing the incentive to provide high e¤ort. Under short-term
debt nancing, agency costs arise when default occurs in the rst period and
creditors obtain a high fraction of equity, reducing the incentive for entrepre-
neurial e¤ort in the second period. Agency costs may also arise if the face
value of debt is excessively high, leading the entrepreneur to provide a low
level of e¤ort in the rst period. Similarly, under long-term debt nancing
the problem may appear when rst-period earnings are low, and the entrepre-
neurs payo¤ for a high level of e¤ort in the second period is diluted by the
creditorsclaims.
9We use the term "lemon" to describe a situation where private information leads to the
underpricing of a "good" type. See Akerlo¤ (1970) for a classical example.
12
3.1 Preliminary results
In order to nd an equilibrium in the model with both asymmetric informa-
tion and moral hazard we will rst establish some preliminary results. We
know from the previous section that u is optimal nancing under asymmet-
ric information without moral hazard. With moral hazard the entrepreneurs
e¤ort depends on private benets from a low level of e¤ort. If these benets
are small, the low level of e¤ort will be chosen and vice versa. The following
lemma shows the conditions under which u is the rst-best nancing (i. e. the
entrepreneurs level of e¤ort is high in both periods) when information about
the rms type is symmetric.
Lemma 1. When information about the rms type is symmetric, the
entrepreneurs level of e¤ort is high in both periods under strategy u if and
only if
  1=2 and (1  2b)  c (3)
or
 > 1=2 and (1  2b)(1  )  c (4)
Proof. See Appendix 1
Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 imply that when both asymmetric information
and moral hazard are present, a rst-best equilibrium can exist if the cost of
low level of e¤ort is su¢ ciently high, or the private benets from a low level
of e¤ort are small. Comparing conditions (3) and (4) for each type leads us to
the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Strategy u is a rst-best pooling equilibrium if and only
if: 1) l > 1=2 and c  (1  2b)(1  s); 2) l  1=2 < s and c  minf(1 
2b)(1  s),(1  2b)lg; and 3) s  1=2 and c  (1  2b)l.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
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Next we consider situations where the equilibrium described in Proposition
2 does not exist. These are:
l > 1=2 and c > (1  2b)(1  s) (5)
l < 1=2 < s and c > minf(1  2b)(1  s); (1  2b)lg (6)
s < 1=2 and c > (1  2b)l (7)
3.2 E¢ cient separating equilibria
An equilibrium is e¢ cient if nancing is obtained for both stages, the entre-
preneurs level of e¤ort is high in both periods (respecteively, the incentive
constraints should hold for both rm types in each period) and his expected
payo¤ equals 1  2b.
The general intuition concerning the role of asymmetric information in our
model is as follows. The prices of securities can be a¤ected by the lemon
e¤ect in both periods. Intuitively, l would seem to have an informational
advantage in the rst period: lower prots in this period mean that this type
of rm can capitalize on the adverse selection problem. On the other hand,
in the second period, the informational advantage passes to s. If l were to
issue equity in the rst period, it would always be mimicked by s. s stands to
gain in the second period by being perceived as a rm with high prots in the
second period.10
To signal its type, l can issue short-term debt. In particular, if the cost of
bankruptcy is high enough (or when non-recourse debt is issued), rst-period
10For more discussion regarding this observation see Miglo and Zenkevich (2006) and
Miglo (2007).
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interest rates will be relatively high compared to second period rates, since l
is considered badin the rst period and goodin the second. Given such
an interest rate prole, we show that if s issues short-term debt, it will be
benecial to creditors, but not to the rm. This is because creditors benet
in the rst period due to high interest rates and the fact that s does well in
that period.
The analysis below develops the above ideas but rst we argue that u
is never played in an e¢ cient signaling equilibrium. Recall that in an envi-
ronment without moral hazard, up-front equity is a good strategy because it
can mitigate problems related to asymmetric information about the timing of
earnings (Proposition 1). The result holds when there is moral hazard but its
extent is relatively small (Proposition 2). If pooling with u is not an equilib-
rium described in Proposition 2, the private benets from a low level of e¤ort
are relatively high for at least one rm type (conditions (5)-(7)). Even if for
one rm type private benets are low and it can use u, these benets will be
high for the other rm type (which does not play u in equilibrium). Therefore,
that type will mimic the other type by playing u. Since the rst-period share
price is always 1 2b
n
(type-independent), it will not su¤er from the adverse
selection problem, but will gain by providing a low level of e¤ort.
Lemma 2. When information between the rm and the market is sym-
metric, the share price under strategy e or u equals 1 2b
n
.
Proof. See Appendix 3.11
Proposition 3. u is never played in an e¢ cient signalling equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix 4.
11For similar results and discussions of the intuition behind it see, for example, Miglo
and Zenkevich (2006) and Miglo (2007). Our result is more general because it takes the
possiblity of up-front nancing into consideration as well.
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Proposition 3 is consistent with Neher (1999). This paper argues that up-
front nancing is less important (stage nancing is more important) when the
entrepreneurial moral hazard problem becomes more important. The author
also discusses empirical evidence consistent with this prediction.
Let us analyze other strategies. Let Vx(;b) be the entrepreneurs nal
payo¤ if strategy x is played, the rm is of type  but is perceived as type b,
given a high level of e¤ort in both periods.
Lemma 3. Ve(s; l) > 1  2b and Ve(l; s) < 1  2b:
Proof. See Appendix 5.
The idea behind Lemma 3 is that when the level of e¤ort is high in both
periods, the rst-period share price is type-independent as follows from Lemma
2. Because the rst-best share price in period 1 is the same for all types, s
benets from its informational advantage in the second period (when it is
really a lemon). This implies that an e¢ cient separating equilibrium where
l plays e does not exist.
Proposition 4. An e¢ cient separating equilibrium where l plays e does
not exist.
Proof. Suppose the opposite is true: that such and equilibrium exists. By
Lemma 3, the payo¤ to s if it mimics l is greater than 1  2b because s > l.
End proof.
Now consider strategy k. The di¢ culty involved in l separating itself by
playing k is similar to the case of strategy e. Since the value of long-term debt
depends on the rms performance in both periods and the values of both
types (under high level of e¤ort in both periods) are equal, then intuitively, l
does not have an advantage when issuing long-term debt.
Proposition 5. An e¢ cient separating equilibrium where l plays k does
not exist.
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Proof. See Appendix 6.
Let us turn to strategy d.
Lemma 4. When information between the rm and the market is sym-
metric, the debt face value under strategy d equals: D = b (1 )(1  b)

.
Proof. See Appendix 7.
This result means that the face value of debt is lower when the probability
of success in period 1 () is higher or when the bankruptcy costs are low (high
) among other things.
Proposition 6. The set of parameters for which Vd(s; l) < 1  2b is not
empty.
Proof. The following is an example proving the proposition:  = 0 and
l < 1=2. First note that when s mimics l it will never use internal nancing
in the second period because the second-period interest rates for type l are
advantageous given the high performance of this type in the second period.
Therefore, when s mimicks l, it borrows b in period 2 and its payo¤ over two
periods can be written as
Vd(s; l) = s(1  b
l
) + (1  s)(1  b
1  l ) (8)
This means that the probability that r1 = 1 equals s. Since the rm is
perceived as type l, the debt face value is b
l
(Lemma 4). Hence, the entrepre-
neurs rst-period expected earnings are s(1  bl ). The reasonning is similar
in period 2.
From (8) we have:
Vd(s; l) < 1  2b, s
l
+
1  s
1  l > 2, (9)
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(l)  s(1  l) + (1  s)l   2l(1  l) > 0; (10)
where  is convex with roots l = 1=2 and l = s. Therefore Vd(s; l) < 1=2
if l < 1=2. [Note that since (10) is strictly positive, Proposition 5 may hold
when  > 0 ( is su¢ ciently small) by continuity] End proof.
A downward sloping interest rate prole (l < 1=2) is suitable for performance-
improving rms and not for rms with a lower rate of prot growth (s > l),
which are better o¤ with upward sloping interest rate prole.
Corollary 1. The only e¢ cient separating equilibrium, where both debt
and equity are issued, is one where l plays d and s plays e.
Proof. It follows from Propositions 3-6 that the only candidate for an
e¢ cient separating equilibrium is one where l plays d and s plays e. An
example is the situation where  is su¢ ciently small or equal 0, l < 1=2 < s
and c > minf(1   2b)(1   s); (1   2b)lg. In this case, a rst-best pooling
equilibrium with u does not exist as follows from (6). Also in this case l does
not mimick s by Lemma 3 and s does not mimick l as follows from the proof
of Proposition 5. End proof.
Finally note that ine¢ cient equilibria are discussed in Appendix 8.
3.3 The models implications
Our model has several theoretical and empirical implications.
(i) Timing of earnings may a¤ect capital structure choice. This paper
develops the idea from Miglo and Zenkevich (2006) that the timing of earnings
may a¤ect the rms capital structure choice.
(ii) Asymmetric information and moral hazard are both important when
considering links between the timing of earnings and capital structure choice.
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We show that the problem of asymmetric information about the timing of
earnings (Miglo and Zenkevich, 2006) can be fully solved by using up-front
equity nanicng. We included moral hazard issues into consideration and
obtain several results (Proposition 1, 2 and Corollary 1) that describe equilibria
under di¤erent situations.
(iii) Debt-equity ratio is negatively correlated with short-term earnings and
positively correlated with long-term earnings. This result is probably the
models main empirical prediction. It is based on the equilibrium described in
Corollary 1 and it also holds in 2 of the 3 equilibria from Proposition 7. Note
that the result about short-term earnings is of particular interest since it has
not been the main focus of existing empirical research.
(iv)Debt-equity ratio is positively correlated with the rate of earnings growth
(long-term vs. short-term). Note that some recent papers found that rms
with a low rate of earnings growth issue equity and rms with high rate of
earnings growth issue debt (Mohamed and Eldomiaty, 2008; and Chichti and
Bougatef, 2010).
4 The model extensions and robustness
Mixed nancing. The main results of the model are robust when the possibility
of mixed nancing is allowed. The main insight that rms with an increasing
prot prole are at a disadvantage when issuing equity while stagnating rms
can "hide" their low second-period performance by issuing equity (the price of
which is type irrelevant), holds under mixed nancing. We can show that if
an equilibrium exists where rms with higher second-period performance issue
more equity, then there also exists a separating equilibrium where these rms
issue less equity, but not vice versa. Thus, the latter equilibrium prevails (see
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analogous reasoning in Goswami, Noe and Rebello, 1995).
Di¤erent prot distribution functions. Now we briey comment on the
models robustness with respect to possible generalizations of projectsprot
distribution functions.12 For example, one can consider situation where rm
prots are ordered by rst-order dominance. One can show that the basic
results such as propositions 1, 3, 4 and 5 and lemmas 2 and 3 hold. This
provides an idea about why rms with "late" earnings avoid issuing equity.
However, since Vd becomes non-linear, the determination of exact conditions
for the existence of di¤erent types of equilibrium, especially for the case of
multiple type economy become very di¢ cult technically. Nevertheless, numer-
ical calculations for some classes of distribution functions conrm the results
found in this paper.
The distribution of types. Our analysis shows that the results may hold
even in a multiple types environment although more research is required.13
Consider the case where all rms have the same total value and only di¤er
in the timing of their earnings. Let the distribution of types be a truncated
exponential distribution: f() = K exp( ),14where  is the expected prot
in the rst period. Let y be the average rst-period earnings in the economy.
High y corresponds to a stagnating economy (low second-period prot) and
a low y indicates a growing economy. Theoretically possible equilibria are:
semi-separating, pooling with debt or pooling with equity. If the equilibrium
is semi-separating, rms with  <  issue debt and rms with  >  issue
equity. This equilibrium is consistent with our results since it implies that the
12Recall that we use the Bernoulli function in the model.
13It is wellknown that calculations become singicantly more complicated in that case.
14Where K = 
e b e (1 b) . K is a constant that allows us to keep the cumulative
probability equal to 1.
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average rst-period performance of rms issuing equity is higher that that of
non-issuing rms. The results of numerical analysis are presented in the Table
below.
Table 1. Equilibrium with multiple types.
The density of types is f() = K exp( ) where  is the expected prot in the rst pe-
riod. y is the average rst-period prot in the economy. High y corresponds to a stagnating
economy (low second period prot) and a low y indicates a growing economy. Theoreti-
cally possible equilibria are: semi-separating, pooling with debt or pooling with equity. If
several equilibria exist, the one with minimal mispricing is chosen. If the equilibrium is
semi-separating, rms with  <  issue debt and rms with  >  issue equity.
a) b = 0:4
 < 0 0 2 4 6 8 10 20
y > 0:5 0:5000 0:4934 0:4868 0:4805 0:4744 0:4687 0:4463
(1   y)=y, econ-
omy rate of
growth
< 1 1:0000 1:0270 1:0542 1:0813 1:1079 1:1336 1:2408
equilibrium type pooling with
debt
separating
 - 0:5999 0:5594 0:5396 0:5297 0:5198 0:5099 0:4703
1   F (), pro-
portion of rms,
issuing equity
0:0 0:0005 0:1720 0:2230 0:2262 0:2276 0:2288 0:2310
b) b = 0:25
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 < 0 0 2 4 6 8 10 20
y > 0:5 0:5000 0:4590 0:4217 0:3905 0:3657 0:3466 0:3000
(1   y)=y, econ-
omy rate of
growth
< 1 1:0000 1:1786 1:3711 1:5610 1:7347 1:8851 2:3336
equilibrium type pooling with
debt
separating
 - 0:7499 0:5750 0:4875 0:4250 0:3750 0:3376 0:2876
1   F (), pro-
portion of rms,
issuing equity
0:0 0:0002 0:2439 0:2907 0:3158 0:3559 0:4126 0:4715
5 Empirical analysis
5.1 Data and Summary Statistics
A sample of companies listed on NYSE, NASDAQ and TSX was taken and
data about their capital structure choices in 2010 and subsequent performances
is obtained from Bloomberg markets, Yahoo nance, Google nance and the
companieswebsites.15 The data provides information about balance sheet,
income statement and operating performance data and about the market prices
of securities issued by the rms. The initial sample contained more than
4000 rms. The nal sample contains a total of 473 rms. Table 2 displays
the number of rms by the value of assets groups as well as some summary
statistics. In order to match the analysis with our model (rms have positive
NPVs), rms with negative earnings in 2011, 2012, 2013 were excluded as well
15https://nance.yahoo.com/, http://www.google.ca/nance,
http://www.bloomberg.com/markets etc.
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as rms with negative equity issues (reduced number of shares outstanding)
or negative net debt change.
5.2 Capital Structure and FirmsEarnings
The key prediction of our model is that rms will have a higher fraction of eq-
uity in their capital structure when they expect higher short-term earnings and
lower long-term earnings. To measure a rms earnings, we use EBIT (earn-
ings before interest and taxes) as opposed to net earnings, which is consistent
with the spirit of our model. Table 3 presents the means of the performance
measures. In calculating the percent changes, we exclude the rms that have
negative or zero starting values since their results are meaningless.
We use 2011 earnings or the sum of the 2011 and 2012 earnings for short-
term earnings. Our model has two periods (stages). So to stay in the spirit of
our model, market capitalization in 2012 or in 2013 is used as an apprximation
of the value of long-term earnings (the "second stage" has no time limit for
real rms). We dene capital structure as the debt ratio (ratio of debt over
total assets). To test our prediction, we run the following regression:
DebtRatio2010 = + 1  STEarnings+ 2  LTEarnings+ 3  Assets2010 +
4  FARatio2010 + 5  TaxRate2010 + 6  Cash2010 + "
where the dependent variable is the debt ratio in 2010. The independent
variables include short-term earnings (STEarnings) and long-term earnings
(LTEarnings). STEarnings are EBIT in 2011 measured in percent to EBIT
in 2010. LTEarnings is the market capitalization in 2012 measured in percent
to the market capitalization in 2010. We also run a similar regression where
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STEarnings is the average of the earnings in 2011 and 2012 and LTEarnings
is the market capitalization in 2013. The control variables include the company
size, which is the value of assets, the xed assets ratio (xed assets over assets),
the e¤ective tax rate and the amount of cash. The xed assets ratio and the
e¤ective tax rate are used to capture the e¤ect of trade-o¤ theory (tax shield
and bankruptcy costs) and cash is used to measure the extent of moral hazard
issues (the "empire-building risk" etc.).
The correlation coe¢ cients and the OLS regression results are reported
respectively in Table 4 and Table 5. The results show that the debt ratio is
negatively associated with short-term earnings and positively associated with
long-term earnings. The positive association with xed assets is consistent
with the notion that rms with smaller bankruptcy costs are more leveraged.
The negative correlation with the e¢ cient tax rate is consistent with the neg-
ative correlation between debt and protability, i.e. more protable rms
have higher tax rates and smaller leverage. The positive association with the
amount of cash is consistent with the agency cost of debt theory (debt and
discipline idea etc.) in that rms with larger risk of moral hazard problems
should have higher debt.
STEarnings are singicantly negatively correlated with the debt ratio.
LTEarnings are signicantly and positively correlated with the debt ratio.
This result implies that rms will raise more equity when the short-term earn-
ings are stronger. This result is consistent with the prediction of our model.
Table 2
Sample and Summary Statistics
This table presents the sample and summary statistics of rms. Assets are in 000000s
dollars. FARatio is Fixed Assets/Assets. Cash is in 000000s. The columns Debt/Assets,
FARatio, TaxRate and Cash show the average value of parameters within rms groups in
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2010.
Assets Number of
Firms
Debt/Assets FARatio TaxRate Cash
0-100000 47 0.3278 0.1165 0.2263 7.8480
100000-
1000000
138 0.3071 0.1841 0.2580 51.2444
1000000-
5000000
159 0.2779 0.2892 0.2517 257.6564
5000000-
10000000
41 0.2735 0.2926 0.2704 459.1837
10000000-
50000000
73 0.2604 0.3419 0.2629 2,089.0679
50000000- 15 0.2092 0.2275 0.2701 10,622.6508
Total 473
Table 3
FirmsPerformance 2011-2013
EBIT and Market Capitalization are measured in dollar 000000s. The table shows the
average value of parameters within rms groups. EBIT (11,12) is the average of earnings
in 2011 and 2012. EBIT (2011,%) is the ratio EBIT (2011)/EBIT (2010). EBIT (11,12,%)
is the ratio EBIT (11,12)/EBIT (2010). MCap (2012) and MCap (2013) are the market
capitalizations in 2012 and 2013. MCap (2012,%) is the ratio MCap (2012)/MCap (2010).
MCap (2013,%) is the ratio MCap (2013)/MCap (2010). In calculating the percentage
changes (growth rates), observations with negative or zero starting values are excluded.
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Assets
(2010)
EBIT
(2011)
EBIT
(11,12)
EBIT
(2011,%)
EBIT
(11,12,%)
MCap
(2012)
MCap
(2013)
MCap
(2012,%)
MCap
(2013,%)
0-100000 9.2 19.2 1.53 1.67 38.2 44.6 2.41 2.07
100000-
1000000
46.7 99.9 1.56 1.96 408.3 467.3 1.36 1.64
1000000-
5000000
218.7 475.9 1.03 1.18 2,188.2 2,435.4 1.31 1.50
5000000-
10000000
581.1 1,288.9 1.11 1.28 5,991.2 6,673.6 1.18 1.32
10000000-
50000000
2,340.1 5,020.0 1.02 1.15 18,577.0 20,310.5 1.14 1.25
50000000- 14,413.7 30,598.1 0.99 1.09 107,046.3 118,971.7 1.09 1.23
Total 823.5 1,762.6 1.29 1.52 6,572.9 7,272.4 1.47 1.59
Table 4
Correlation Coe¢ cients
This table presents the correlation coe¢ cient matrix.
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Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Debt/Assets (2010) 1
Assets (2010) -0.055 1
TaxRate (2010) -0.157 -0.016 1
FARate (2010) 0.451 0.028 -0.005 1
Cash (2010) 0.017 0.802 -0.032 -0.055 1
EBIT (2011) -0.081 -0.017 -0.072 -0.019 -0.013 1
EBIT (11,12) -0.077 -0.016 -0.064 -0.013 -0.011 0.958 1
Market Cap (2012) 0.137 -0.014 0.019 -0.009 -0.011 -0.001 0.000 1
Market Cap (2013) 0.164 -0.031 -0.035 -0.034 -0.025 0.006 0.008 0.561 1
Table 5
Regression Results of Capital Structure
The dependent variable is the Debt/Assets (2010) ratio. *** indicates signicance at
1% level, ** indicates signicance at 5% level, and * indicates signicance at 10% level.
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Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept 0.074
[2.90]***
0.087
[3.12]***
0.167
[8.77]***
0.218
[9.21]***
0.034
[1.67]*
Assets (2010) -0.000
[-1.7]*
-0.000
[-1.8]*
-0.000 [-1.0]
TaxRate (2010) -0.1250
[-2.30]**
-0.1230
[-2.30]**
-0.2170
[-3.70]***
FARate (2010) 0.353
[10.66]***
0.350
[10.46]***
0.351
[11.07]***
Cash (2010) 0.000 [0.87] 0.000 [0.92]
EBIT (2011) -0.007
[-1.5]*
EBIT (2011,12) -0.002
[-1.4]*
-0.003
[-1.8]*
-0.0040
[-1.90]**
-0.002
[-1.2]*
MarketCap (2012) 0.038
[3.08]**
MarketCap (2013) 0.038
[4.06]***
0.038
[3.55]***
0.039
[3.77]***
0.039
[4.13]***
Adj. R2 0.241 0.230 0.029 0.054 0.229
F-value 26.014 24.522 5.708 10.002 47.620
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(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
0.168
[8.97]***
0.175
[8.04]***
0.227
[8.68]***
0.044
[1.99]***
0.176
[8.19]***
-0.000 [-1.1]
-0.2170
[-3.70]***
0.348
[10.86]***
-0.000
[-1.7]*
-0.000
[-1.8]*
-0.0100
[-1.90]**
-0.0110
[-2.20]**
-0.006
[-1.2]*
-0.0100
[-1.90]**
-0.003
[-1.7]*
0.041
[3.03]***
0.043
[3.17]***
0.039
[3.18]***
0.041
[3.02]***
0.038
[3.56]***
0.033 0.023 0.047 0.007298926 0.027
6.368 4.666 8.803 5.970352551 5.290
6 Conclusions
This paper examines optimal nancing in a dynamic setting (two-stage in-
vestment process) under asymmetric information. The analysis is based on
the idea that rms have private information about the timing of earnings. It
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is shown that separating equilibria may exist where rms issuing equity have
higher performance in the rst period and lower performance in the second
period than rms issuing debt. The paper contributes to POT by explaining
why rms can issue equity as a signal. It contributes to signalling theory by
explaining why debt does not necessarily signal a rms quality. The paper
suggests that the debt-equity ratio is negatively correlated with short-term
earnings and positively correlated with long-term earnings. It also provides
new insights on important capital structure phenomena, such as the negative
correlation between debt and protability. To our knowledge, this is the rst
attempt to simultaneously explain all of these phenomena. Finally, this paper
provides some new theoretical results that have not yet been tested. These
are: 1) the decision about the issuance of standard securities, such as debt and
equity, can be a¤ected by the private information about the timing of earnings;
2) rms issuing equity have higher performance shortly after the issue; and 3)
up-front nancing is less likely (stage nancing is more likely) when the moral
hazard problem is important.
Appendix 1
The second-period incentive constraint (IC) is
2Emaxfm2 + r2  D; 0g  c+ 2Efm2  D; 0g (11)
where D denotes the total face value of debt in the second period. The left
side of (11) shows the entrepreneurs expected payo¤ if e2 = 1 and the right
side shows his payo¤ if e2 = 0. If D > 0 thenm2 = 0 and (11) can be rewritten
as
2Emaxfr2  D; 0g  c (12)
IfD = 0 then (11) becomes: 2E(m2+r2)  c+2Em2 which also corresponds
to (12). Note that the left side of (12) depends on the rst-period dividend
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policy. If rst-period dividends are high, the rm will borrow more in the
second period and the IC will be stronger. The entrepreneurs optimal decision
is to invest as much as possible, using internal nancing, given that both
investment in the second period and a high level of e¤ort are socially optimal
by (2).
If the second-period IC holds and the entrepreneur provides a high level of
e¤ort in the rst period, the entrepreneurs expected payo¤ equals the rst-
best rm value which is equal to 1  2b. Therefore, the rst-period IC is
1  2b  c+ E[1W1 + 2W2 j e1 = 0] (13)
Under strategy u the rm is always able to nance the second stage of the
project internally. Thus, D = 0 in (12) and the second-period IC is:
2Er2  c (14)
Given that r1 = W1 = 0 when the rst-period level of e¤ort is low, we can
rewrite (13) as
1  2b  c+ 2Er2 (15)
As follows from the proof of Proposition 1, 1 = 2 = 1   2b and we can
rewrite (14) and (15) as:
(1  2b)  c (16)
(1  2b)(1  )  c (17)
If a rm has a growing earnings prole, the consequences of entrepreneurial
moral hazard are less pronounced in the rst period because the expected prot
from a high level of e¤ort is relatively low, and visa versa for the other type.
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Formally, if   1=2 the rst condition is stronger.16 On the other hand if
 > 1=2 the second condition is stronger. Hence we have: u is optimal if and
only if
  1=2 and (16) or  > 1=2 and (17) (18)
Appendix 2
If s  1=2 then from (18) u is the rst-best strategy for each type when
c < (1   2b)j; j = l; s. Proposition 2 follows from s > l. If l > 1=2 then,
from (18) u is the rst-best strategy for both types if c < (1  2b)(1  j); j =
l; s. Again, Proposition 2 follows from s > l. Now consider s > 1=2  l.
From (18) u is feasible for both types if c < (1 2b)(1  s) and c < (1 2b)l.
Note that in all cases, the o¤-equilibrium beliefs supporting these equilibria
can be the same as those described in the previous proposition.
Appendix 3
Suppose the opposite is true, such that an equilibrium exists where l plays
u. First-period IC is
c < (1  2b)l
From (5)-(7) this is only possible when l > 1=2 or l < 1=2 < s and
c > (1  2b)(1  s) (19)
The latter implies that if s mimics l and cheats (provides a low level of e¤ort)
in the second period, its total payo¤ is (1  2b)s + c and this is greater than
1   2b by (19). Thus s will mimic l and such an equilibrium does not exist.
The proof is analogous for the case when s plays u.
Appendix 4
16Obviously, if  = 1=2 the conditions are equivalent.
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Denote the total amount of funds raised in the rst period by b1; b1 2
fb; 2bg, the number of shares issued by n, the dividend per share in period t
bywt, total dividend in period t byWt, and cash retained in period t (analogous
to being invested in zero coupon bonds) by mt. The equilibrium relationships
are:
1) rst-period total investment equals rst-period total nancing:
b1 = pn (20)
b1 = b+m1 (21)
2) market valuation of shares (share price equals expected dividends per
share):
p = E(w1 + w2) (22)
3) total dividend in period t:
W1 = w1(n+n) (23)
W2 = w2(n+n) (24)
4) earnings in period t:
r1 +m1 = W1 + f +m2 (25)
maxfm2 + r2  D2; 0g = W2 (26)
First-period earnings (the sum of cash or investment in zero-coupon bonds
in period 1 and cash ow from the project) can be used to pay out dividends,
nance the second stage of the project, or invest in zero-coupon bonds in
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period 2. On the other hand, second-period earnings are distributed, in total,
to the shareholders.
5) market valuation of second-period debt (recall that the rm raises b  f
externally in the second period):17
b  f = Eminfm2 + r2; D2g (27)
Using equations (21), (23), (24), (25), (26), (27) and the identity
min(X; Y ) + max(0; X   Y ) = X (28)
with X = m2 + r2 and Y = D2, we can transform (22) into:
p =
Er1 + Er2   2b+ b1
n+n
This equation together with (20) produces
p =
1  2b
n
(29)
For second-period debt, we get from (27) that:
D2 =
b  f
1   (30)
Appendix 5
Consider Ve(l; s). From Lemma 2, p = 1 2bn and therefore 1 =
n
n+b=p
=
1 2b
1 b .
17Further, we assume for brevity that D2 > 0 which implies m2 = 0. Note that no results
are a¤ected by this assumption. To see this, suppose that D2 > 0 and 0 < m2 < b   f .
Then D2 =
b f m2
1  . The entrepreneurs second-period expected payo¤ is V2 = (1  )(1+
m2   b f m21  ) = 1      b + f +m2. Now suppose that the entrepreneur invests m2 in
the second stage of the project. Then D2 =
b f m2
1  and the entrepreneurs expected payo¤
equals V 02 = (1  )(1  b f m21  ) = 1     b+ f +m2 = V2. The idea is analogous for the
case when m2 > b  f .
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Recall that l nances internally if r1 = 1. Thus
Ve(l; s) =
1  2b
1  b (l(1  b+ 1  l) + (1  l)
2(1  b
1  s )) (31)
Lemma 3 follows from l < s and (31). The proof is analogous for
Ve(s; l).
Appendix 6
Lemma 1A. When information between the rm and the market is sym-
metric, the debt face value equals: L = 2b
1 +2 if b  1 +
2
2
and L =
2b 2+(1 )2
(1 ) if b >
1 +2
2
.
Proof. L is determined by the following equation:
2b = Eminfm2 + r2; Lg (32)
Recall that long-term debt is issued with dividend covenants. Therefore, the
rm uses its initial resources to nance the second stage, and must invest
rst-period earnings in zero-coupon bonds. We can thus rewrite (32) as:
2b = Eminfr; Lg
where r denotes the rms total cash ow over the two periods. Note that r
equals 2 with probability (1 ), equals 1 with probability 2+(1 )2 and 0
otherwise. Two cases are possible. If L  1 the probability that the creditors
get the face value equals the probability that r1 + r2  1. Otherwise they get
nothing. Thus:
2b = (1   + 2)L (33)
If L > 1, we have
2b = (1  )L+ 2 + (1  )2 (34)
Let L() denote the perfect information face value of long-term debt if the
rm is of type , assuming that k is a rst-best strategy for  under symmetric
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information (it would invest in both periods and provide a high level of e¤ort
in both periods).
Lemma 2A. L(s) > L(l) if s + l < 1, L(s) = L(l) if s + l = 1,
and L(s) < L(l) if s + l > 1.
Proof. L(s) and L(l) are both less than 1. Otherwise, a high level of
e¤ort will not be provided in the second stage when r1 = 0. Thus, Lemma 5
follows directly from (33). End proof.
Corollary 1A. 1) Vk(s; l) > 1   2b if s + l < 1,Vk(s; l) = 1   2b
if s + l = 1, and Vk(s; l) < 1   2b if s + l > 1; 2) Vk(l; s) > 1   2b
if s + l > 1, Vk(l; s) = 1   2b if s + l = 1, and Vk(l; s) < 1   2b if
s + l < 1.
Proof. Suppose s + l < 1 and consider Vl(;b). This is equal to:
Vl(s; l) = s(1  s)(2  L(l)) + (2s + (1  s)2)(1  L(l))
By Lemma 5
Vl(s; l) > s(1 s)(2 L(s))+(2s+(1 s)2)(1 L(s)) = Vl(s; s) = 1 2b
This proves the rst part of the corollary. The proof is analogous for the
second part. End proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider a separating equilibrium where l plays k
and s plays e. Then from (33) L = 2b
1 l+2l
. Suppose that l + s < 1. In this
case s will mimic l by Corollary 2. Thus:
l + s > 1 (35)
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which implies s > 1=2. From (5), (6) and (35) we get c > (1 2b)(1 s). Now
consider the IC of type s in the second period. As was mentioned previously,
1 =
1 2b
1 b . Type s earns 1 s b in the second period. Hence, the entrepreneur
will provide a high e¤ort only if c < (1 2b)(1 s b)
1 b . However, this contradicts
the condition c > (1  2b)(1  s). End proof.
Appendix 7
Denote the face value of rst-period debt by D1. We have the following
relationship:
b = Eminfr1; D1g+ Pr(r1 < D1)EW2 (36)
Equation (36) takes into account the fact that creditors receive a fraction 
of equity when rst-period cash ow is insu¢ cient to pay o¤ short-term debt.
This equation can be rewritten as
b = D1   (1  )E(W2 j r1 < D1) (37)
If r1 < D1 (default), f = m2 = 0. Using (26), (27) and (28) with X = r2 and
Y = D2 we get:
E(W2 j r1 < D1) = 1     b (38)
(37) and (38) imply
D1 =
b  (1  )(1     b)

(39)
Appendix 8
Other separating equilibria with debt and equity.
From Corollary 1, we know that the debt/equity ratio is negatively cor-
related with short-term performance and positively correlated with long-term
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performance. The problem with our analysis thus far is that we have not con-
sidered an ine¢ cient separating equilibrium. The general intuition regarding
this equilibrium is as follows. If both types invest only in the rst stage of the
project and provide high e¤ort in that period (the issued claims will obviously
depend only on the rst-period expected performance), l will mimic s (recall
that s is the low prot type in this period). A situation where a rm only
invests in the second stage is impossible because the stages are technologically
dependant. Thus, at least one type will invest in both stages, provide high
e¤ort in the rst period, and provide high e¤ort in the second period when
r1 = 1 (and possibly when r1 = 0). Otherwise, the investors will be unable
to provide nancing for both periods because cash from only one period is
insu¢ cient to cover the total investment, by (1). In equilibrium, l is unable to
use strategy e and invest in both stages since it will be mimicked by s. This
leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1A. The only ine¢ cient separating equilibria where both debt
and equity are issued, are the following: 1) l plays d and invests in both stages
(high e¤ort in both stages) and s plays e, invests in the rst stage, and provides
high e¤ort in that stage; 2) l plays z and invests in both stages (high e¤ort in
the rst stage and also in the second stage when r1 = 1) and s plays e and
invests only in the rst stage; and 3) s plays z and invests in both stages (high
e¤ort in the rst stage, and also in the second stage when r1 = 1) and l plays
e and only invests in the rst stage.
Proof. l plays e and s plays d. If l provides a high e¤ort in both periods it
will be mimicked by s because of the "lemon" argument (Lemma 3). Consider
the case when l only obtains rst-period nancing (and provides a high e¤ort
in this period). We have:
b = pn (40)
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p =
l
n+n
(41)
(40) and (41) imply p = l b
n
and 1 =
l b
l
. The equilibrium payo¤ of l is
obviously l b. Suppose that s provides a high e¤ort in the rst period. Then
D1 =
b (1 s)(1 s b)
s
. If l mimics s it has at least l(1   bs ) > l   b. Thus,
such a situation is impossible. Now if s provides low e¤ort in the rst period
and is subsequently liquidated, the entrepreneur gets c. The IC for l is
c < l   b (42)
If s mimics l it gets l b
l
s > l   b > c (its equilibrium payo¤). The latter
inequality follows from (42). Thus such an equilibrium is impossible.
The cases where l or s provide low levels of e¤ort in the rst period and high
levels of e¤ort in the second period are impossible. The rms total earnings
are 1  ; which is less than the total investment by (1). The last observation
also holds for the situations considered below.
l plays e and s plays k. Consider the case when l only obtains rst-period
nancing (and provides a high level of e¤ort in this period). The situations
where the level of e¤ort of s is high in the rst period and low in the second
(under both earnings realizations) and where its e¤ort is low in the rst period
and high in the second are impossible by (1): the earnings from only one stage
are not su¢ cient to cover the total cost of investment (2b). Now suppose that
s provides a high level of e¤ort in both periods. The incentive constraint for
l is given by (42). If l + s > 1, then l mimics s and gets a higher payo¤
than its equilibrium payo¤ by Corollary 1. Consider l + s < 1. It implies
l < 1=2. From (6) and (7) c > (1   2b)l. The latter contradicts (42). The
only possible case where s provides high level of e¤ort in both the rst and
second periods is when r1 = 1.
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l plays k and s plays e. The case when the e¤ort of l is high in the
rst period and low in the second, under both states, is impossible given the
previous argument. Now consider the case when l provides a high level of e¤ort
in both periods provided r1 = 1. The payo¤ to l equals 2l 2l  2b+c(1 l).
Suppose that s exerts high e¤ort in both periods. In this case, l will mimic
s. l will provide a high level of e¤ort in the second period only if r1 = 1;
and will get 1 2b
1 b (l(1   b + 1   l)) + c(1   l). This is more than his payo¤
in equilibrium. Thus, l will deviate. Finally, the only possible cases are those
where s obtains nancing for the rst period and provides a high level of e¤ort
in that period, and where l provides a high level of e¤ort in both periods
provided that r1 = 1.
l plays d and s plays e. First consider the following case: s provides a
high level of e¤ort in both periods and l provides a high level of e¤ort only in
the rst period. We have p = 1 2b
n
. If l mimics s and provides a low level of
e¤ort in the second period it gets 1 2b
1 b l+ c which is more than its equilibrium
payo¤ of l   b. Now consider the case when both types provide a high level
of e¤ort in the rst period and a low level of e¤ort in the second period. We
have p = s b
n
. Hence, l mimics s, and gets s b
s
l > l   b.
One can see from Proposition 6 that in any equilibrium, a rm issuing
equity has smaller expected earnings in the second period than a rm issuing
debt.
Finally, note that strategy u does not play an important role. If u is played
in equilibrium then by (1) the e¤ort should be high in both periods. However,
such a situation is impossible given that (5)-(7) should hold (analogously to
Proposition 3). End Proof.
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